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MAKING SENSE OF KSR AND OTHER 
RECENT PATENT CASES 
Harold C. Wegner* †
Introduction 
The recent Supreme Court review of KSR International Inc. v. Teleflex 
Inc., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, and Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 
manifests the Court’s current interest in the patent jurisprudence of the Fed-
eral Circuit. Now it is evident that the Court has a level of concern sufficient 
to guarantee the possibility of grant of certiorari—whereas formerly a case 
could rarely generate sufficient interest for review. For long-range impor-
tance in patent law, KSR stands alone as the single most important Supreme 
Court patent decision on the bread and butter standard of “obviousness” in 
the more than forty years since the 1966 Graham v. John Deere. KSR will 
remain the leading interpretation of the Graham standard for quite some 
time. 
I. The MICROSOFT Paradigm: A Collective Message 
to the Federal Circuit 
It is particularly evident to anyone who has listened to oral arguments in 
KSR, eBay, and Microsoft that the Supreme Court has taken a special inter-
est in the Federal Circuit—a court that marches to a different drummer than 
its sister circuits. The Microsoft case perhaps best exemplifies one such dif-
ference: the penchant by some on the Federal Circuit for “judicial 
legislation.” In this case of otherwise only limited importance, the Federal 
Circuit is seen as a highly balkanized court, unable to resolve intra-circuit 
differences even sitting en banc.  
Microsoft, which deals with the export of a “golden master” to load 
Windows onto computers, is one in a series of panel opinions adopting con-
tradictory interpretations of an arcane and rarely-used statute originally 
enacted to deal with offshore infringement of a shrimp deveiner and other 
similar mechanical combination inventions. Yet, in the past few years, courts 
have used wildly differing interpretations when deciding whether to apply 
the statute outside its mechanical combination patent origins.  
Demonstrating the Supreme Court’s newly found special interest in the 
Federal Circuit, Justice Ginsburg rebuked the Federal Circuit for its “dy-
namic judicial interpretation” which led to hundreds of millions of dollars 
damages being assessed against Microsoft for exporting its software tech-
nology. Justice Ginsburg noted that the exporting clearly fell entirely outside 
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the statute and that the Federal Circuit’s contrary interpretation undercut 
clear congressional intent. Without citation of any economic study or schol-
arly work or anything else, the Federal Circuit majority had held that 
allowing Microsoft to escape the shrimp deveiner statute would  
permit[ ] a technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring the advances in a 
field of technology . . . that developed after the enactment of [a remedial 
statute] . . . . [I]f [the remedial statute] is to remain effective, [it] must 
therefore be interpreted in a manner that is appropriate to the nature of the 
technology at issue.  
Additionally, Judge Alan Lourie, writing for the Federal Circuit’s major-
ity, ignored the public policy arguments of the dissent. Circuit Judge Rader, 
in his dissent, argued that the majority “provide[d] extraterritorial expansion 
to U.S. law by punishing under U.S. law ‘copying’ that occurs abroad. 
While copying in Düsseldorf or Tokyo may indeed constitute infringement, 
that infringement must find its remedy under German or Japanese law.”  
Responding to the Federal Circuit majority’s judicial activism, Justice 
Ginsburg stated, “While the majority’s concern is understandable, we are 
not persuaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of [the statute] is in order. 
The ‘loophole,’ in our judgment, is properly left for Congress to consider, 
and to close if it finds such action warranted.” 
II. KSR: A Patentability Standard for the Ages
Despite the balkanized nature of today’s Federal Circuit, the 1966 
Graham v. John Deere case remains the leading precedent on “obviousness,” 
the statutory standard of patentability that is now codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a). Nonetheless, KSR significantly tightened the Graham standard of
obviousness in ways that will continue to have a lasting impact. KSR could 
remain the leading case on patent law obviousness for decades. Unlike the 
arcane issue of Microsoft that is present in perhaps one in a thousand cases 
(at most), the obviousness standard of KSR is implicated in nearly all patent 
validity challenges.  
Yet if past is prologue, there will not be another Supreme Court review 
of the standard of obviousness for quite some time. In the forty-one years 
between Graham and KSR, the Court made no major refinement of the ob-
viousness standard.  
Indeed, in that interval, the Court reached the merits of obviousness in 
just three arcane cases: Anderson’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Co. in 1969, 
which involved an asphalt paving machine said to be inventive because of its 
combination of a known radiant-heat burner with a standard bituminous 
paver; Dann v. Johnston in 1976, which involved a general purpose com-
puter programmed to provide bank customers with an individualized and, 
categorized breakdown of transactions; and, only three weeks later, the no-
torious Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., which involved using a wall of water to 
flush barn manure—a method ridiculed by the Court for making no advance 
beyond Hercules’ mythical cleansing of the Aegean stables by flushing them 
with a diverted river. 
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III. Raising the Bar to Sustain Patent Validity
KSR raises the bar for sustaining the validity of patents in virtually every 
invention outside chemistry and biotechnology. The res of KSR is a combi-
nation of old elements—an old “gas pedal” and an old electronically-
controlled car engine. Beyond the new molecules of chemistry and biotech-
nology, almost all inventions in other technologies combine old elements; 
patentability is determined by whether the combination was obvious. Until 
KSR, a combination was nonobvious and could be patentable unless there 
were signposts teaching how to assemble the various pieces, much like an 
instruction manual does for an unassembled toy. If existing teaching manu-
als or patents showed how to complete the puzzle, then the invention was 
“obvious” to a “worker skilled in the art”—the patent statute’s “reasonable 
man.” While this hypothetical soul may have had an advanced education, he 
was a boring fellow, bereft of the ingenuity to figure out how to put puzzle 
pieces together without prompting; per KSR, this hypothetical man was an 
“automaton.”  
Now, under KSR, if the puzzle pieces exist, the combination of elements 
may be obvious to this worker in the art merely because a problem is 
known. Unlike the pre-KSR automaton, the post-KSR worker in the art has 
“ordinary creativity.” As a result, inventions that were nonobvious the day 
before KSR suddenly became obvious to this modern man of ordinary skill 
in the art.  
The tightening of the patentability standard is further manifested by 
KSR’s endorsement of the “obvious to try” standard that had been in disfa-
vor throughout the history of the Federal Circuit. This disfavor dates back to 
pronouncements by the late Giles Sutherland Rich in the 1960s while sitting 
on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the Federal Circuit’s predeces-
sor. Under KSR, if a problem can be solved by only a finite number of 
solutions, it may be “obvious to try” the various solutions, and, if so, the 
invention may be prima facie obvious.  
KSR impacts the validity determination of virtually every invention other 
than new entities of chemistry and biotechnology. These fields are the main 
areas of innovation that do not principally involve combination claims. Dis-
putes over the patentability of most other technologies, however, involve 
combination claim challenges, where the key battle concerns whether it 
would have been obvious to assemble the components in the patentee’s 
combination.  
IV. Making Sense of a Balkanized Federal Circuit
While the Federal Circuit panel opinion in KSR is completely out of 
whack with what the Supreme Court subsequently decided, there is little 
difference between the Supreme Court’s KSR holding and earlier decisions 
of some other Federal Circuit panels. This apparent contradiction reflects 
the balkanized nature of the Federal Circuit that Microsoft previously dem-
onstrated.  
In the context of obviousness, even prior to the recent prominence of 
patent law within the Supreme Court’s docket, most Federal Circuit judges 
understood that court’s subordinate relationship to the Supreme Court. This 
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recognition was perhaps best seen in Circuit Judge Linn’s well-reasoned 
2006 opinion in In re Kahn—written prior to the grant of certiorari in KSR. 
Whereas the lower court in KSR had denied obviousness because there was 
no express teaching or motivation shown in the prior art to put together the 
puzzle pieces—the different teachings of the references—Judge Linn pieced 
together a long string of precedents from his court that convincingly demon-
strated that no express teaching or motivation need be shown in the prior art 
to establish obviousness; the motivation could be implicit. Judge Linn’s pre-
scient analysis was rewarded when the Supreme Court cited his Kahn 
opinion with approval. 
Conclusion  
In less than four years, the Federal Circuit will be led by new Chief 
Judge Randall Rader, who will shortly celebrate his twentieth anniversary as 
a member of the judiciary and more than fifteen years as a key member of 
the intellectual property law faculty of the George Washington University 
Law School. Within four years, all but Circuit Judges Sharon Prost and 
Kimberly Moore will be senior-eligible, leaving the possibility of up to nine 
new judges on the twelve member Federal Circuit. Given the scope of this 
imminent judicial turnover on the Federal Circuit, the KSR case surely will 
be the new Rader Court’s Bible for learning the law of obviousness. 
